How are political events reflected in financial asset prices? Break points in sovereign debt prices are analyzed for Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Germany and Belgium during 1930-1948, using 
Introduction
This study examines how wartime events influence financial markets. Using the fact that capital market investors try to maximize the return on their portfolio given the information available, fluctuations in the prices of financial assets reflect changes in expectations about their future performance. Specifically, the fluctuations in the prices of government bonds of six countries traded at the Stockholm Stock Exchange during the period of World War II are analyzed. Government bonds of a particular country are expected to trade at higher prices when the expectations regarding debt servicing and repayment improve. This is likely to be the case when the traders at the Stockholm Stock Exchange were more optimistic about the political and military situation of that country during the War. In contrast, political and military defeats of a country during the War lower such expectations and reduce its bond prices. Bond prices should thus be expected to reflect wartime events. The relationship is, however, indirect: it works through how traders evaluate the effect of wartime events on the probability of a country's bonds being serviced and repaid. In the extreme case, a country completely destroyed during the War is normally neither expected to service nor to pay back its debts at maturity. If traders do not believe that a country will reemerge, the value of the bond drops to zero. But in many cases even countries defeated and occupied by enemy forces may sometimes be expected to recover, so that the bond values do not drop to zero. Our use of Swedish data is of particular relevance for the study, since the Swedish securities markets, unlike most other European markets, were allowed to function freely during the entire war. We would therefore expect that foreign government bonds might have been more accurately priced in Stockholm than on their own excessively regulated stock exchanges. 1 Looking at wartime events through their reflections on financial markets is not intended to substitute for the time-honored historical methods. These are based on a careful selection and interpretation of facts in the light of general knowledge of the period and the particular circumstances prevalent (see, e.g., Carr, 1961 and Marwick, 1970) . The economic approach pursued here may serve to complement these methods. It may help to overcome a possible bias connected with collecting, selecting and interpreting historical facts. The approach used by historians tends to be ex post facto, i.e., after the consequent developments are known. This knowledge may bias the evaluation of events, and may lead to "facts" being overlooked or overemphasized, as the case may be.
In recent years, there has been a growing literature on analyzing political and institutional change using historical financial market data. Treating financial markets primarily as markets for the dissemination and distribution of information, it is possible to derive measures of the impacts of political, economic and institutional changes on the prices of financial assets. A path-breaking analysis is that of Willard et al. (1996) , who analyze how events during the U.S. civil war affected the market for "greenbacks", a special currency issued by the Union. Kucher (2000, 2001) analyze the prices of domestic and foreign government bonds traded on the Zurich stock exchange during the 1930s and 1940s and show that many important events before and during World War II, such as the annexation of Austria by the Germans, the outbreak of the War, the German defeat at Stalingrad and the Yalta conference, strongly affected bond prices. Oosterlinck (2001) warfare (Germany and Finland), some were occupied nations (Belgium, Denmark and Norway) and one was a neutral state (Sweden). This diversity across nations yields variance to our sample and potentially expands the set of findings.
The study starts by sketching out the basic ideas underlying the analysis of bond market prices and their interpretation. We then describe the institutional features of the Swedish bond market during this period and provide more details about the data used. In section 4 we set up the econometric model used to identify structural breaks in the bond price indexes. Section 5 pre-sents all breaks that were identified for each country and a discussion as to how they can be interpreted in the light of historical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
Politics reflected on financial markets
Fixed-interest securities, e.g., bonds, are financial assets associated with well-defined future streams of debt repayments and hence low levels of uncertainty for the investors holding them. By construction, bonds are priced on financial markets according to the size of the coupon (the interest rate), the time to maturity and the perceived repayment ability of the bond issuer. Bonds issued by national governments are rather exceptional for several reasons. They are special because their debt service obligations are unenforceable by the creditors, which practically means that the bondholders cannot take the defaulting nation to a court of law when it postpones or cancels repayments. They are also normally related with low or even zero default risk, which thereby means that sovereign default is rather a matter of lacking willingness to repay debt than a matter of lacking ability to pay (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981 Although financial markets are the arena where politics is reflected, it is still the investors and traders, active on these markets, that make it all happen. The actual transmission of political events into asset prices rests on the information dissemination by actors. According to the traditional theories about informational efficiency of capital markets (Fama, 1970) , the price of a financial security should at any given point in time reflect all information available to the market actors. Any sudden price change should hence reflect new, previously unknown, information that has been supplied to the actors, which has shifted their expectations regarding the asset. In this framework, the actors never find it profitable to deviate from their own ex-pectations, which means that the prices correspond to their actual beliefs about the future.
More recent theory rather emphasizes that financial markets also demonstrate major ineffi- Unfortunately, data on trading volumes in government bonds on the Stockholm Stock Exchange is incomplete. What we do know is that total bond turnover increased its share of total securities trading from about 25% in the 1930s to about 50% in the 1940s. 5 We have, however, manually collected a sample of turnover figures to get a reasonable estimate of total turnover that constituted trade in government bonds, both domestic and foreign. By calculating exact volumes during March, June, September and December of every second year, we have found that the foreign government bonds represented about 20% of the trading in government bonds during the 1930s, whereas it constituted only about 2% during the 1940s.
Hence, the war induced investors to either sell their bonds to actors outside Sweden (as would be suggested by Figure 1 ) or merely not want to sell off their holdings at a substantially lower price.
Since our analysis focuses on how contemporary actors made conjectures about actual and expected events, it is of great interest to identify who these actors were. For obvious reasons, we neither know the identity of traders nor of investors. However, we know that in 1939, 50%
of the outstanding Swedish government bonds were held by public institutions (e.g., the Riksbank and municipalities), 34% by financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, thrifts) and about 5% by individuals. 6 When these investors wanted to adjust their portfolios, they most likely turned to the stock exchange, and there is plenty of evidence suggesting that commercial banks and insurance companies were active speculators on the bond market dur- All government bonds analyzed in this study were issued and traded in Swedish kronors, which means that bondholders were protected from debased payments. Hence any inflation or exchange-rate shocks affect all bond yields in the same way, so that no corrections are required. 9 The bond data used are end of month quotes from the Stockholm Stock Exchange collected in the official stock exchange price lists (Stockholms Fondbörs kurslista) and the weekly business chronicle Affärsvärlden. The country indexes are calculated from loan sizeweighted yields and the over market index is a loan-size weighted index of all countries. 
Econometric methodology
To detect the relation between politics and financial markets, we use a moving-windows technique to search for structural breaks in the bond price series. This is not an event study where a list of existing interesting dates are proposed and tested. Instead, we want the data to speak for itself and not reflect our prior knowledge of historical events. The basic idea of the method is to estimate linear regressions within small time windows and then statistically check for differences in the means of the bond prices between them. To find all turning points in the series, we employ a four-step procedure, which is based on Banerjee et al. (1992) and has been employed in several studies (e.g., Willard et al., 1996; Kucher, 2000, 2001 ).
The appropriate length of the time window is subject to a trade-off between windows long enough to avoid irrelevant short-term price variations and short enough to capture persistent structural breaks. Following Frey and Kucher (2001), we choose a 36-month (3-year) window.
In step 1, we place the 36-month window so that it starts from the first observation (January 1930, except for Germany and Norway) and then we estimate equation (1) (1) t P is a country's bond price index at period t, t P is the weighted bond market index and t ε is a white noise error term. 11 The lag length k used in this study is 1, which has been decided on according to the backward selection approach suggested by Perron (1989) . 12 We make a Wald test for a structural break (change in the constant) in the middle of the window and record the F-statistic.
In step 2, we move the window one month forward (now starting on February 1930) and repeat the estimation of (1) and the break test. This is repeated until each country's entire price index has been covered by time windows and the tests pursued in the first two steps.
In step 3, we take the sequence of 11 Equation (1) contains no deterministic time trend because of the short time periods of the windows we have used.
12 Perron (1989) decided k such that the t-statistic for k was above 1.6 (in absolute number) and the t-statistics for j , j > k below 1.6. The same procedure was used by Willard et al. (1996 
Although equation (2) procedure between level-and point-dummies, determined by the existence of a unit root in a series. We have tested all our series for the existence of unit roots, using the Perron (1989) procedure and adjusting for visible breaks that might erroneously give rise to unit roots. The results are that for all series we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root, which hence lets us use level-dummies in (2).
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Naturally, we cannot capture all factors that affect the prices quoted on the capital markets.
Unlike many other previous structural break studies, we therefore include a market variable in order to correct for exogenous shocks to the data that would affect all countries similarly. This variable takes care of the potential bias due to omitted variables that occur in these slim model specifications. As a rough measure of the accuracy of the model, the repeated window estimations of (1) on each country produced average R 2 between 0.57 (Belgium) and 0.90 (Sweden).
A potential problem with our algorithm is that it does poorly in capturing gradual changes in bond prices. These might arise if market actors gradually anticipate an upcoming event and capitalize on the prices, which might make it hard both to trace and to correctly date the break. We hope to mitigate some of these problems by our explicit use of historical literature. 13 We test the price series as a whole, because testing each time window would be too complicated. Besides the time-inefficiency of such a project, we would each time need to adjust for the eventuality of a structural break somewhere in the window that could otherwise bias our results. The test is the traditional one suggested by Perron (1989) which is to estimate: 
Empirical results

Common threats, 1930-1948
The overall bond index for all countries represented at the Stockholm Exchange is shown in There are four structural breaks in the overall bond market statistically significant at tha 1%-level. The largest price reduction occurred right at, or even slightly before, the outbreak of World War II, in August 1939. Historians normally date the outbreak of the War to September 1, when Germany invaded Poland. Of course, there were earlier signs that a war was imminent, which induced investors in Stockholm to sell government bonds and to keep their assets in other forms, probably cash. This downward shift in demand is reflected by a price fall of 8.5% in government bond prices. The other three structural breaks in the overall market cannot be attributed to any wartime events. This is not surprising, since the six countries included were affected by the wartime events in quite different ways, as we will show in the following sections.
Sweden, 1930-1948
Figure 5 shows the price index for Swedish government bonds during the period, which reveals an increasing trend over the period as a whole. Measured in yields, this represents a decrease from about 4.4% to about 3.0%. However, as a reaction to these events, investors fled the bonds issued by these two countries and invested instead in Swedish government bonds. Moreover, the shift corresponds to a period of intense Swedish mobilization against the new threats, including the issue of a new large government bond loan. The government wanted to drive down the market rates and therefore decided to set a lower interest rate on the new loan than the prevailing market rate.
The government convinced several large institutional actors on the financial market to under-write the loan at par and thereby support their nation in need. The new low yield government bond induced investors to buy the older high coupon bonds, the prices of which accordingly went up until the yield corresponded to the new loan. 14 This conclusion regarding the positive effect of the new loan on general Swedish bond prices was also drawn by the contemporary press.
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The fourth significant break was the 1.8% conditional price increase coinciding with the Yalta conference between the 4 th and 11 th of February 1945. At this conference, the three large nations in the alliance, Great Britain, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, met to sort out the policies regarding postwar Europe. It was also decided that the allied forces would only accept an unconditional surrender by Germany with the goal of establishing beyond doubt Germany's defeat. In Sweden, this conference was highlighted because it represented an important step towards an ending of the war and also possibly resolving many of the trade-related credits Sweden had given to many of the countries at war, including Germany. Another domestic event that attracted considerable attention at the same time was the 0.5% cut in the discount rate made by the Riksbank, which caused bond prices to rise. +1.8%*** Yalta conference. Discount rate cut. a Change in conditional price γ from equation (2). **, *** represent significance at the 5%-and 1%-levels, respectively.
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Denmark, 1930-1948
The Danish government bond price index is presented in Figure 6 and in Table 2 we report statistically significant structural breaks occurring during this period. The market pessimism was transmitted to all government bonds, including Danish bonds. +7.0%** Yalta conference a Change in conditional price γ from equation (2). **, *** represent significance at the 5%-and 1%-levels, respectively. The first significant break in the Norwegian series, displayed in Table 3 +4.0%** Allied invasion in Normandy a Change in conditional price γ from equation (2). **, *** represent significance at the 5%-and 1%-levels, respectively.
Norway, 1936-1948
Finland, 1930-1947
In Figure 8 , the Finnish government bond price index is shown. This index shows little, if any, resemblance to the bond prices of the other Nordic countries. There are many reasons for this, but the most important one is that Finland faced a different enemy, namely the Soviet Union. This conflict turned out to be devastating for Finland both during and after the war.
The war ended in bitter defeat and the postwar period was associated with large war debts and persistent territorial conflicts with the Soviet Union. -8.4%*** Worsened terms of war indemnity to Soviet Union. a Change in conditional price γ from equation (2). **, *** represent significance at the 5%-and 1%-levels, respectively. Figure 9 shows the price index for German government bonds traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The bond prices on German bond loans (compared to the overall market) was constantly below par value and even fell throughout the period, representing an increased uncertainty about Germany's capacity to win the War and to service and repay its loans. In the 1930s, the status of the German war debt from World War I was perhaps the most highlighted issue in international finance all over the world, including Sweden. A journalist in Affärs-världen even described the Young loan as "the barometer of the political state of the market in Europe". Table 5 reports the statistically significant structural breaks of German bonds. The first major structural break was the market reaction to a threat from the president of the German Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, in March 1934, to unilaterally write off the value of the German sovereign debt. This moratorium was also put in place in July that year, but the investors interpreted the threat as serious enough and immediately capitalized on it in their bond holdings.
Germany, 1930-1947
The invasion of Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War was received pessimistically by the investors trading in Stockholm. German government bonds fell by more than 17% compared to the overall market, suggesting that the traders were skeptical about Germany's fate in the war and its capacity to service and repay its debt.
The Blitzkrieg successes during April-June 1940 significantly appreciated German bonds by 22%. After that, there are no long-term changes in the German prices until the Soviet offensive at Stalingrad, which turned out to be the turn of the war. Finally, when Germany surrendered in May 1945, investors considerably lowered their expectations of the probability that Germany would repay its debt. The magnitude of the break suggests that the traders in Stockholm did not foresee an unconditional German surrender and hence did not capitalize on that event in the bond prices before. This may sound surprising but a possible explanation is that the investors in Sweden were not convinced that the allies would really stick to an uncondi- -53.3%*** Germany surrenders unconditionally. a Change in conditional price γ from equation (2). **, *** represent significance at the 5%-and 1%-levels, respectively. Figure 10 shows the price index of the Belgian government bonds traded in Stockholm. According to the results in Table 6 , the index dropped sharply at the outbreak of the War but bounced back again when German troops started to face heavy resistance from late 1942 onwards. +16.4%*** Potsdam conference a Change in conditional price γ from equation (2). *** represent significance at the 1%-level.
Belgium, 1930-1947
Conclusions
In this study, we analyze whether geopolitical events affecting a whole nation can be traced in the secondary market price of that nation's outstanding government debt. Understanding this linkage gives useful hints to those preoccupied with analyzing the effects of domestic or international politics, both today and in bygone times. Theory tells us that, since investors have no incentives to systematically deviate from rationally trading on new information, there should not be any lasting pricing anomalies in the bond market, given that it is working unrestrictedly. We therefore exploit financial market data to investigate how political events during World War II affected six industrialized countries: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden. Using new secondary bond market price evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange during 1930-1948, we construct bond price indexes for each country and the market as a whole. The Swedish data is particularly advantageous, since it comes from a financial market that was not specifically regulated due to the war. Hence, we expect these prices to be more efficient than those quoted on many other European markets, if they were open for trading at all. Using this data, we conduct a quantitative search for structural breaks in these country indexes, without using any a priori notions about where to look.
Our prime finding is that many of the structural breaks found in our search clearly reflect some of the most distinct political events before and during the Second World War. For ex-ample, the outbreak of the war depressed bond prices beyond the overall market index for all countries but Sweden and Finland. The Finnish price cut occurred when it was unexpectedly attacked by the Soviet Union three months later. The investors also reacted strongly to the German occupation of Denmark, Norway and Belgium during the spring of 1940. In sharp contrast, German bond prices increased during the same time, indicating the positive impact on war successes. Although Sweden was put under increasing political pressure by these events, the market actors in Stockholm did not oversee the investment opportunities they created.
The financial data also strongly suggest that the major turning point of World War II was the Battle of Stalingrad, which is completely in accordance with the consensus view among historians. At that juncture, German bond prices fell significantly, while those of the nations Germany occupied increased. The allied invasion of June 1944 in Normandy had a much weaker effect. We believe that the reason for this was that the invasion was expected among market actors, although the exact time (and place) was unknown.
Our data also confirm the heterogeneity in war experiences across the countries. In Finland's case, this was due to its partnership with Germany throughout most of the war. The peace in 1945 then implied war debts and a continued dependency on the Soviet Union, which was negative for the Finnish economy. Sweden also differed from the others, being the only neutral state in our sample. Swedish bond prices therefore primarily reflected domestic political events, related to fiscal policy making and the general economic status of the country.
Altogether, our analysis suggests that financial market actors successfully identified the relevant political events and even attributed them a magnitude that levels with today's consensus in the historical profession.
